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ABSTRACT

In recent years, U.S. pharmaceutical companies have
expanded their new drug trials beyond the borders of the United
States. While the companies have a variety of reasons for
making this move, among them may be a desire to avoid Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation and monitoring.
Lack of adequate supervision of drug trials conducted in the
developing world endangers both the subjects of the tests and
the consumers in the United States. It is unclear whether the
FDA can execute regulatory and supervisory authority abroad.
The FDA statute does not clearly authorize the agency to
regulate extraterritorially. Applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality,the FDA should not, therefore, be allowed to
regulate drug testing abroad. Exceptions to the presumption
might, however, be applicable. Regardless of whether U.S.
courts allow the FDA to bring actions against companies for
violations abroad, internationalcooperation is needed to control
drug testing.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1996, Pfizer, a large U.S. drug company, developed a new
antibiotic called Trovan. 1 Wall Street analysts predicted that Pfizer
could make as much as one billion dollars if Trovan were approved for
all of its potential uses. 2 Yet, other drugs in Trovan's class had been
found to cause joint damage during animal testing, and questions
existed as to whether Trovan could have dangerous side effects in
children. 3 To counter these concerns, the company wanted to obtain
convincing evidence of the drug's safety for use on children.4 As it
happened, one potential application of Trovan was to treat an
epidemic strain of bacterial meningitis. 5 Because spinal meningitis is
relatively rare in the United States, the company was unable to find
enough U.S. patients to conduct a clinical study on the scale required
6
for full Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval.
In February 1996, a Pfizer physician learned of a meningitis
epidemic in northern Nigeria. 7
Thus, Pfizer quickly obtained

1.
Joe Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in Balance; Finding an
Abundance of Subjects and Lack of Oversight Abroad, Big Drug Companies Test
Offshore to Speed Products to Market, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at Al.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id. The FDA never approved the sale of Trovan for use on children in the
United States. It was only briefly available to adults in the United States before it was
severely restricted because of its association with fatal liver failures. The European
Union banned Trovan outright. Joe Stephens, Pfizer Experiment Spurs Criminal
Probe,WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2001, at A15.
5.
Stephens, supra note 1.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
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8
Pfizer
approval from the Nigerian government to begin tests.
occupied
was
also
that
Nigeria
in
Kano,
a
hospital
in
opened a clinic
by a Doctors Sans Frontiers clinic that was busy treating the
epidemic. 9 The two organizations began to compete for hospital space
and patients. 10 In the Pfizer experiment, researchers administered
Trovan to 100 children, and a comparison drug to 100 other
children. 1 Eleven children died in the study, and others suffered
12
Pfizer claimed
severe injuries including deafness and lameness.
the
and
particularly
that the fatality rate of the children in the study,
U.S.
in
children treated with Trovan, was better than is typical
3
hospitals.'
After Pfizer obtained FDA approval for Trovan, many questions
were raised regarding Pfizer's research practices. Allegations of
failure to obtain consent of human subjects, mistreatment of patients,
substandard levels of care, and reckless and inaccurate record
keeping were leveled against Pfizer. 14 Children in the control group
who improved while receiving a proven anti-meningitis drug were
switched to one-third of the recommended dose in what Pfizer
claimed was an attempt to "reduce the pain after initial injections" of
the medicine. 15 According to a spokesman for the comparison drug's
manufacturer, "clinical failures . . .and perhaps deaths of children
could have resulted from the low dosing."'16 The researchers ceased
all treatment at the close of the study, and did not follow up17on the
long-term effects of the drug on the children who were treated.

Id. See also Stephens, supra note 4 (alleging that the "Nigerian doctor who
8.
oversaw the experiment for Pfizer said in an interview that a key ethics approval
document was created as long as a year after the trial concluded, and then backdated
so it would appear to have been issued before the experiment began").
Stephens, supra note 1.
9.
Id.
10.
11.
Id.
Id.
12.
Id. A Pfizer spokeswoman said that the trial was "sound from medical,
13.
scientific, regulatory and ethical standpoints," and that it may have saved lives. Drugs
GiantAccused of Rights Violations, AFRICA NEWS, Sept. 3, 2001, available at Westlaw,
Africanews.
See generally, Stephens, supra note 1. Consent on the part of children
14.
poses special problems in the United States as well. At the behest of Congress, the
department of Health and Human Services has begun to review the procedures for
obtaining the consent of child clinical research participants, and their legallyauthorized representatives. Best Pharmaceuticals for Children, Pub. L. No. 107-109,
115 Stat. 1408, 1416 (2002).
Stephens, supra note 1.
15.
Id.
16.
Pfizer does not claim to have lived up to all of the provisions of the Helsinki
17.
Convention; for example, the convention requires that "at the conclusion of the study,
every patient entered into the study should be assured of access to the best proven ...
methods identified by the study." World Medical Association, Ethical Principles for
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A lawsuit has been filed in U.S. federal court on behalf of 30
Nigerian families who claim that their children were "unwitting
participants in the 'secret testing,"' and who suffered a variety of
injuries including brain damage, paralysis, and death. 18 The suit
contends that Pfizer's research methods were in violation of FDA
regulations-particularly regulations requiring prior approval of the
study by the local Nigerian authorities. 19 It also alleges that Pfizer
failed to obtain the informed consent of the children and their
families as required by FDA regulations and international human
20
rights law.
The FDA reportedly has now opened a criminal inquiry into
Pfizer's allegedly improper medical experiments conducted in
Nigeria. 21 Should charges result, this would be the first regulatory
action brought by the FDA for corporate conduct abroad. 22 If the
government brings an action against Pfizer, it could be argued that
the United States lacks the extraterritorial jurisdiction necessary to
enforce U.S. law. It is unlikely, however, that a criminal prosecution
of Pfizer would be based on the statutory provisions on FDA drug
approval. 23 Instead, such a prosecution would likely be based on the
FDA's regulations concerning human experimentation and foreign
clinical drug trials. While Congress has the power to apply U.S. law
extraterritorially, 24 the courts have had a mixed response to
extraterritorial application of U.S. law without specific congressional
25
authorization.
This Note addresses both the potential criminal prosecution of
Pfizer regarding the experimentation Pfizer performed in Nigeria
that was not in compliance with FDA regulations, as well as the
problem of protecting human research subjects abroad. Part II of the
Note discusses the growing problem of protecting human research
subjects from reckless and unethical experimentation conducted by
U.S. corporations and institutions. A number of recent scandals
involving drug trials in the developing world have brought calls for
increased regulation and oversight abroad by sponsor nations, such

Medical Research Involving Human Subjects,
adopted
June
1964,
at
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/itcnote.pdf [hereinafter Helsinki Guidelines].
18.
Stephens, supra note 1.
19.
Id.
20.
Kevin Gopal, FDA Stays Silent on Trovan Charges, PHARM. EXEC., Oct. 1,
2001, at 24.
21.
Stephens, supra note 4.
22.
Of course, the FDA could potentially bring actions against Pfizer based on
providing false information to the government. This, however, is beyond the scope of
this Note.
23.
Id.
24.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 402 (1987). The impact of the limitations on jurisdiction on Congressional
power is unclear. Id. § 403.
25.
See infra notes 109-29.
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as the United States. 26 Part III examines the current status of
extraterritorial application of U.S. law in the absence of a clearly
expressed congressional intent to apply the law abroad. Part IV then
evaluates the FDA's extraterritorial regulatory activities under the
current law. The FDA lacks a clear mandate from Congress to act
extraterritorially in a regulatory capacity, but the overall statutory
scheme of the FDA and the FDA's need to protect U.S. consumers,

provide a basis for allowing some FDA regulatory authority to extend
extraterritorially.

FDA regulations to be applied extraterritorially,

however, must stem from the agency's authority to protect U.S.
citizens, rather than a desire to protect the human rights of research
subjects abroad.
Part V of this Note addresses the need for alternative approaches
to protection of human research subjects abroad, regardless of

whether the courts might allow the FDA regulations to be enforced.
The doctrine of comity and general democratic principles suggest that

the United States should not extend its protection of human research
subjects abroad unilaterally. 27 Unilateral action by the United States
would rob developing countries of their ability to affect their own
policies. It could also cause friction between the United States and
EU nations, whose concepts of human rights in drug research differ.
International law already provides a basic individual right to
informed consent. 2 8 Human research subjects in the developing

26.
Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services have both
expressed concern over overseas medical research. In 2001, the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission issued a report recommending increased supervision by the FDA
and tougher enforcement of informed consent rules by the FDA. Joe Stephens, Panel
Suggests Rules ForForeignDrug Tests, WASH. POST, May 1, 2001, at A21. According to
Public Citizen, implementation of the Commission's recommendations would actually
provide protections below those of the Helsinki Guidelines. Press Release, Public
Citizen, National Bioethics Advisory Commission Report Dangerously Weakens
International Protections, April 30, 2001, available at http://old.citizen.org/press/prsid47.htm. Public Citizen said that the Commission's recommendations provide too
much flexibility to drug companies in opting out of the requirements of the Helsinki
Guidelines. Id.
27.
But see Dawn Joyce Miller, Research and Accountability: The Need for
Uniform Regulation of International PharmaceuticalDrug Testing, 13 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 197, 227-28 (2001) (calling for the U.S. government to apply its regulatory
protections extraterritorially to safeguard "vulnerable test populations"); see also
Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility,
111 YALE L.J. 443, 532-33 (2001) (suggesting that domestic public and private legal
regimes should place human rights duties on corporations similar to antitrust,
securities, and anti-bribery regulation).
28.
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (providing
that "[nlo one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation"). This right is grouped with the prohibition of torture, and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Id. The United States is a signatory
to this treaty.
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world may best be protected by a legally-enforceable set of
international guidelines. These guidelines should be the result of a
collaborative effort by both developed and developing nations, and
should account for the role of corporate actors. The FDA's mandate
clearly allows it to participate in an international collaborative effort.

II. THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY AND THE FDA's
ATTEMPT TO KEEP PACE

A. The Globalizationof PharmaceuticalResearch
Protection for human subjects of biomedical research has become
a global issue. 29
Transnational drug corporations based in
industrialized countries rely on the developing world for a major pool
of test subjects. 30 In turn, the governments of most developing
countries rely on the regulatory processes of more-developed
countries to determine which drugs are safe to use; a drug's use is
thus permitted in a developing country once it has been approved for
use in the country of manufacture. 3 1 "For Americans, it means some
of the newest drugs on U.S. shelves are tested at sites far removed
from U.S. regulators-sometimes in countries with few inspectors
32
and little history of examining drugs for safety and effectiveness."
Until recently, the United States required that regulatory
approval of new drugs be based on domestic research data. 33 In 1994,
however, the rules governing new drug research were liberalized to
allow the use of foreign data. 34 Sponsors of pharmaceutical research
have moved their experiments abroad in order to recruit research
subjects more quickly, enabling companies to gain FDA approval -and
bring their drugs to market sooner. 3 5 Additionally, pharmaceutical
companies are able to conduct experiments at a much lower cost
overseas; the per-patient cost of a clinical trial in the United States

29.
Ileana
Dominguez-Urban,
Harmonization in the Regulation of
PharmaceuticalResearch and Human Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 245, 245 (1997).
30.
See id.
31.
Id. at 257.
32.
Mary Pat Flaherty & Joe Stephens, Testing Tidal Wave Hits Overseas; On
Distant Shores, Drug Firms Avoid Delays--and Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2000,
at Al.
33.
Dominguez-Urban, supranote 29, at 264.
34.
21 C.F.R. § 314.106(b)(1) (1994).
35.
Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services,
The Globalization of Clinical Trials: A Growing Challenge in Protecting Human
Subjects, Sept. 2001, at 8, available at http://oig.lls.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-00-00190.pdf
(hereinafter OIG Report).
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averages $10,000, in Russia costs average $3,000, and in poor nations
36
the average is much less.
As early as 1986, approximately 18 percent of research studies
37
conducted by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry took place abroad.
During the 1990s, the number of pharmaceutical researchers who
worked abroad and voluntarily reported their experiments to the
FDA increased approximately 16-fold, from 271 in 1990 to more than
4,400 in 1999.38 The FDA currently lacks any way to track the total
number of experiments conducted abroad, nor can it determine the
number of new drugs that are approved on the basis of foreign clinical
3 9
investigations.
Foreign drug trials are sometimes conducted specifically to avoid
U.S. government controls.
One example is a Johns Hopkins
University School of Medicine trial in India of an anti-cancer drug
called M4N. 40 The experiment was conducted in secret after the FDA
banned the drug from the United States. 4 1 California-based Maxim
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was prevented from testing a new drug in the
United States because the FDA wanted more test results on
animals. 42 It then went to Russia, where doctors were not told about
the FDA's concerns. 43 A Pennsylvania drug company sought to
conduct clinical trials on infants in Latin America using a placebo
44
control, despite the availability of treatments for the disease.

36.
S.N.M. Abdi, Drug-Test Rules Aim to Protect the Poor, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at 2002 WL 2302949.
37.
Dominguez-Urban, supra note 29, at 246. Tests conducted before 1994
were generally for the use of the drug company, not applied to gain FDA approval.
38.
Joe Stephens & Mary Pat Flaherty, More Oversight of Drug Trials Urged;
Overseas Testings Pose 'a Serious Problem,' Study Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2001, at
A7; OIG Report, supra note 35, at 6. This data reflects the number of experiments that
researchers reported to the FDA before the experiments began.
39.
OIG Report, supranote 35, at 6. The OIG Report particularly criticized the
FDA for its lack of information on where NDA research was being conducted, and
which investigators were involved in new drug research. Id. at 20. The OIG Report
indicates that FDA regulatory efforts were severely handicapped by its lack of
knowledge as to these foreign investigations. Id. at 12-16.
40.
Abdi, supra note 36.
41.
Id.
Johns Hopkins University investigated the experiments after
allegations that the researcher did not obtain permission for the experiment from an
internal review board at Hopkins that considers the safety of human studies.
Jonathan Bor & Tom Pelton, Hopkins Scientist is Probed in India Cancer Drug Study,
BALT. SUN, July 31, 2001, at Al. Hopkins found that the researcher did not perform
adequate preliminary tests on animals before using the drug on human subjects. John
Biemer, Hopkins Sanctions Scientist for Drug Trial in India, ASSOC. PRESS NEWSWIRE,
Nov. 12, 2001, available at Westlaw, APWires Database. The university banned the
researcher from serving as lead investigator on future research involving human
subjects. Id.
42.
Flaherty & Stevens, supra note 32.
43.
Id.
44.
See Miller, supra note 27, at 231.
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HIV/AIDS research also provided an impetus for foreign clinical
trials. To help improve access to needed treatments for HIV/AIDS,
drug producers were encouraged to conduct clinical trials of vaccines
and new drugs in developing countries. 45 Such research has led to
charges of unethical behavior of, and exploitation by, Western
researchers. 46
One such case was the comparison of the HIV
treatment AZT with a placebo course. The researchers and their
sponsor governments were accused of using an ethical "double
standard" because the use of a placebo in a clinical trial would not
47
have been allowed in a developed country.
B. The FDA's Role in Drug Testing Abroad
Through the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and
the FDA, the United States exercises control over the introduction of
new pharmaceutical drugs into the U.S. marketplace. 48 The FDCA
and FDA regulations place extensive research and human testing
burdens on pharmaceutical companies seeking to bring new drugs to
49
market, and heavily regulate that research and testing.
The first step to new drug approval in the United States is
usually an Investigational New Drug Application (IND). 50 Before a
study is conducted, a new drug sponsor must submit an IND to the
FDA. 51 Testing done under an IND is supervised by an institutional
review board "designated by an institution to review, to approve the
initiation of, and to conduct periodic review of, biomedical research

45.
David Fidler, "Geographical Morality" Revisited: International Relations,
InternationalLaw, and the Controversy over Placebo-ControlledHIV Clinical Trials in
Developing Countries, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 299, 302 (2001). The United States has been
slow to recognize the role of human rights in access to medicine. "The United States
was the sole country out of fifty-three nations to veto the UN Human Rights
Commission's declaration on access to HIV/AIDS treatment as a fundamental right."
Rosalyn S. Park, The InternationalDrug Industry: What the Future Holds for South
Africa's HIV/AIDS Patients, 11 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 151 (2002).

46.
Fidler, supra note 45, at 303.
47.
Id. Generally, the FDA encourages the use of placebo groups in studies.
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126. However, placebo use is inappropriate where it would be
contrary to the interest of the patient. Id. § 314.126(b)(2)(iv). For a discussion of the
use of placebo controls in the United States, see Stuart L. Nightingale, Challenges in
Human Subject Protection, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J., 493, 498 (1995).
48.
See 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2002).
49.
For a general description of the domestic new drug approval process, see
David W. Jordan, InternationalRegulatory Harmonization: A New Era in Prescription
Drug Approval, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471 (1992).
50.
OIG Report, supra note 35, at 1-2. The purpose of the 0IG Report was "to
document the growth of non-U.S. clinical drug trials contributing data to New Drug
Applications for Food and Drug Administration approval, and to assess the FDA's
capacity to assure human subject protections in these trials. Id. at iii.
51.
Id. at 1.
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involving human subjects." 52 The primary purpose of institutional
review is to "assure the protection of the rights and welfare of the
human subjects. '53 After testing and research are complete, the drug
sponsor submits a New Drug Application to obtain FDA approval to
market the drug.5 4 While all clinical drug research conducted in the
United States must occur under the auspices of an IND, 55 this is not
56
true of clinical studies conducted abroad.
Foreign drug research data can be admitted one of two ways. A
drug researcher may conduct its foreign clinical tests under the
57
auspices of an IND, as it would for a U.S. clinical study.
Alternatively, the researcher may skip the IND, and instead conduct
its foreign clinical tests in a manner consistent with either the 1989
59
Declaration of Helsinki guidelines 58 or local country guidelines.
The researcher is to comply with whichever guidelines provide the
greater protection for the human test subjects. 60
The Helsinki
guidelines concentrate on the protection of human subjects; while
recognizing that "in current medical practice . . .most procedures
involve risks and burdens," the guidelines place substantial

52.
21 C.F.R. § 56.102(b)(21)(g) (2002). It has been suggested that U.S.
regulations do not go far enough to ensure informed consent in domestic research. Jay
Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 7, 24 (1993).
Specifically, that the regulations "do not go far enough in emphasizing the centrality of
the inviolability of the human rights of research subjects." Id. "The regulations on
informed consent should have been formulated in a way that place considerable
restrictions on the use of patient-subjects." Id.
53.
21 C.F.R. §§ 56.102(b)(21)(g) (2002).
54.
OIG Report, supranote 35, at 1.
55.
Id. at 2.
56.
Id.
57.
The FDA has begun to inspect investigations conducted under INDs. OIG
Report, supra note 35, at 10.
58.
21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c)(4) (2002) (codifying World Medical Association
General Assembly, Declaration of Helskinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects).
The Helsinki Guidelines, as adopted by the FDA, are
considered by the international medical community to provide the highest standards of
ethics in human experimentation. Barry R. Bloom, The Highest Attainable Standard:
Ethical Issues in AIDS Vaccines, SCIENCE, Jan. 9, 1998, at 186.
59.
21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c)(1).
The FDA's decision to waive the IND
requirement is
based on a recognition that much important clinical research is conducted
throughout the world, which meets the legal and ethical standards of the
countries in which it is conducted, but which is carried on without the kind of
institutional review required under FDA's requirements. To insist on absolute
adherence to FDA's IRB requirements would obligate the agency to reject valid
scientific data generated overseas.
New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product Regulations, 52 Fed. Reg. 8798 (Mar.
19, 1987). For a discussion of the function of Institutional Review Boards, see ROBERT
J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 321-63 (2d ed. 1986).
60.
21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c)(1); OIG Report, supra note 35, at 2.
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responsibility for the protection of human subjects on those who
61
conduct medical trials.
The FDA regulations generally require informed consent of
human test subjects. 62 In the foreign setting, the FDA's new drug
regulations require the implementation of institutional review
boards, defined as bodies "designated by an institution to review, to
approve the initiation of, and to conduct periodic review of,
biomedical research involving human subjects. The primary purpose
of such review is to assure the protection of the rights and welfare of
the human subjects. ''63 Foreign boards are expected to adhere to
international ethical standards, including those set by the FDA, the
countries' own regulatory agencies, and international agreements
such as the International Conference on Harmonization. 64 The FDA
directly oversees the protection of foreign human research subjects
through its regulations of clinical investigators. 65 In addition, the
FDA regulations place direct responsibility on the corporation who
seeks to bring a drug to market, requiring that new drug sponsors
must also monitor the investigators at the clinic level.6 6 The FDA
also expects that local government authorities in the hosting
67
countries will oversee the monitoring of human subjects.

61.
Id. § 312.120(c)(4).
62.
Informed Consent of Human Subjects, 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 (2002) (including
exceptions for cases meeting all of the following conditions: (1) the human subject is
confronted by a life-threatening situation necessitating use of the test article, (2)
informed consent cannot be obtained through inability to communicate or legal
ineffectiveness of consent, (3) there is insufficient time to reach a legal representative,
and (4) there is no better alternative treatment).
63.
21 C.F.R. § 56.102(b)(21)(g). Additionally, the FDA has created an Office of
Human Research Protections (formerly the Office of Protection from Research Risks). The
OHRP is to ensure that "[a]i human subjects research in which American investigators are
involved, and which would be subject to the federal regulations if it were conducted wholly
within the United States, must comply with the federal regulations for the protection of
human subjects in all material respects." U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Office
for Human Research Protection (OHRP), Investigational Review Boards: Internal Research,
available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irb/irb-chapter6ii.htm.
However, the OHRP's
compliance rules mostly continue to rely on self-reporting by drug researchers. See
generally id.
64.
OIG Report, supra note 35, at 3 (citing 21 C.F.R § 312.120(c) (2002)).
65.
OIG Report, supra note 35, at 3. However, enforcement is far from
rigorous.
For example, when the FDA announced that it would require more
verification from drug makers, its representative said, "We might, if the trial data
came from a location unfamiliar to us, ask the sponsor just how they [gained informed
consent], instead of just asking a company to assure us that it gained appropriate
informed consent." Foreign Trials Require Sponsors to Take on Monitoring Role,
WASH. DRUG LETrER, May 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 8205176 [hereinafter
Foreign Trials Require Sponsors].
66.
OIG Report, supra note 35, at 3. As a result of the dependence on selfmonitoring by the drug industry, it is currently "up to CEOs to recognize and stop
shortcuts on patients' rights." Joanna Breitstein, Protecting People Everywhere,
PHARM. EXEC., Dec. 1, 2001, at 12, availableat 2001 WL 13574125.
67.
OIG Report, supra note 35, at 3.
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This system is prone to breakdowns at many levels. The
pharmaceutical industry itself has raised concerns about the ability of
foreign governments to provide adequate review of research. 68 One
large pharmaceutical company was so concerned by the inadequacy of
ethics boards in some regions that it contracted a U.S. institutional
review board to train members of foreign institutional review boards

overseeing its research.

69

In recent years, the FDA has attempted to increase oversight of
foreign experiments. 70 The FDA is concerned that research subjects
in developing nations may not be fully informed of the risks involved,
7
and may be unwilling participants in drug testing. 1

III.

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. LAW AND THE
PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALTY

72
Extraterritorial application of U.S. law has been inconsistent.
The presumption against extraterritoriality should operate equally in
all areas of law: it is a canon of statutory construction, and the courts
have never stated a reason not to apply it consistently in all cases.
While in some areas of the law the presumption has been treated as
nearly irrebuttable, 73 in other areas the courts have readily applied
7 4
U.S. law extraterritorially.
The traditional test for extraterritorial application is based
entirely on a determination of congressional intent.75 Originally, an
outright rule existed against finding extraterritoriality in U.S.

68.
Id. at 15.
69.
Id.
70.
Stephens, supra note 1. The U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services recently created an office responsible for oversight of experiments conducted
by U.S. researchers on foreign patients. Id. According to the head of the FDA Office of
Regulatory Affairs, Associate Commissioner Dennis Baker, international inspections
are a top FDA Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA) priority. U.S. FDA Looks to
Leveraging with Partners to Boost Resources, Face New Challenges, MARKETLETTrER,
April 30, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9078545 [hereinafter U.S. FDA Looks to
Leveraging]. But, due to limited resources, the FDA will practice a regulatory triage,
concentrating on products and firms that pose the highest health risk.
71.
U.S. FDA Looks to Leveraging, supra note 70.
72.
Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The ExtraterritorialApplication of
United States Law and the Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational
Corporations to Domestic and International Standards, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
123, 132 (1996).
73.
Id.
Id.
74.
Suzanne Harrison, The Extraterritorialityof the Bankruptcy Code: Will the
75.
Borders Contain the Code?, 12 BANK. DEV. J., 809, 815 (1996).
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statutes failing explicit congressional authorization. 76 In American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., Justice Holmes provided the classic
formulation of the rule of statutory construction in terms of the
"territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and
legitimate power. '77 "Since the 'operation and effect' of an ambiguous
statute could not be construed to go beyond Congress' legitimate
jurisdictional interests, the rule of construction was inextricably
linked to-if not synonymous with-the jurisdictional principles of
territoriality." 78
This amounted to an irrebuttable presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
Commentators have hypothesized the existence of a marketversus-nonmarket effects distinction to explain both the courts'
acceptance of extraterritorial application of antitrust and securities
laws, and the refusal to apply labor and environmental statutes
extraterritorially without explicit-or even persistent-congressional
authorization. 7 9 While both labor and environmental cases may
involve issues that are clearly "market"-based, courts seem to
distinguish the perceived local conditions of those cases from the
"presumed transnational character of antitrust and securities
disputes. 8 0° The potential impact of anticompetitive trade practices
abroad on the U.S. consumer and marketplace is more readily
8
apparent than the effect of similar labor practices. '
A. Application of the PresumptionAgainst Extraterritorialityin
Environmental and Labor Law
The U.S. Supreme Court recently applied the presumption
against extraterritoriality in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco).8 2 There, the
Court referred to the presumption both as a "longstanding principle"
and as a "canon of construction."8 3 The "longstanding principle" is
that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. '8 4 As a "canon of construction," it is an "approach whereby
unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained. 8 5 The Court's

76.
Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome"' Multinational Misconduct and the
PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 608 (1990).
77.
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
78.
Turley, supra note 76, at 608.
79.
Id. at 601.
80.
Id. at 617.
81.
Harrison, supra note 75, at 821.
82.
See generally Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
83.
Id. at 248.
84.
Id. at 248 (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
85.
Id.
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stated method of application of the presumption, however, is first to
"look to see whether 'language in the [relevant Act] gives any
indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond
places over which the United States has sovereignty or has some
measure of legislative control.' '86 Without an "affirmative intention
of the Congress clearly expressed," 87 there is a presumption that the
statute is "primarily concerned with domestic conditions. '88 How the
requirement of a "clearly expressed" congressional intent squares
with ascertaining "unexpressed congressional intent" is unclear in the
Aramco majority opinion. 89 The dissent complained that the majority
perverted the presumption's purpose by eliminating the search for
"unexpressed congressional intent" in favor of a requirement of
"clearly expressed" Congressional intent. 90
The Court's analysis was based on a finding that while plausible
interpretations
existed that would lead to extraterritorial
application, 91 there were also plausible interpretations that involved
no congressional intent to apply the statute abroad. 92 The Court
further stated that "if we were to permit possible, or even plausible
interpretations of language such as that involved here to override the
presumption against extraterritorial application, there would be little
left of the presumption. '93 This statement is consistent with a
requirement for a "clearly expressed" intent. The Court was unclear
as to whether the presumption could be overcome using outside
evidence of intent, or how strong an indication of congressional intent
94
would be required.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the primary purpose of
the presumption against extraterritoriality is "to protect against the
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations

86.
Id.
87.
Justice Marshall's dissent argued that the Foley Brothers court was the
relevant discussion of the presumption. There, Marshall said, the court analyzed the
Act itself-the legislative history, the overall scheme of the Act, and the relevant
administrative interpretations. This, Marshall argued, was not indicative of a "clear
statement rule" as interpreted by the majority. Id. at 262. Instead, the dissent found
that "the language, history, and administrative interpretations of the statute all
support application .. .to United States companies employing United States citizens
abroad." Id. at 278.
88.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco),
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
89.
Id. at 261-68.
90.
Id. at 268.
91.
These interpretations center around the use of "boilerplate language which
can be found in any number of congressional Acts, none of which have ever been held to
apply overseas." Id. at 251.
92.
Id. at 250-51.
93.
Id. at 253.
94.
See generally id.
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which could result in international discord. '9 5 The Court has long
been concerned by the possibility of upsetting regulatory schemes
abroad. In declining to give extraterritorial effect to the Eight Hour
Law in Foley Brothers v. Filardo, the court said that the intention "to
regulate labor conditions, which are the primary concern of a foreign
country, should not be attributed to Congress in the absence of a
96
clearly expressed purpose."
The Aramco decision is in keeping with the line of cases where
courts have interpreted the presumption against extraterritoriality to
be essentially irrebuttable in employment cases, apparently requiring
Congress to expressly mandate application abroad. 97 Arguments for
overcoming the presumption with respect to the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) were strong.98 In the text of the statute,
Congress stated that it viewed age discrimination as a "burden [on]
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce," and declared its
scope to extend to "trade ... among the several States; or between a
State and any place outside thereof . . ."99 Plaintiffs in the ADEA
cases argued that "any place outside" a state would naturally be a
reference to foreign territory.1 00 The courts instead considered this to
be boilerplate language used by Congress without any such meaning
behind it. In Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc.,10 1 a federal district
court used the presumption to deny application of the ADEA.' 0 2 The
court reached this decision despite its recognition that extraterritorial
application of the ADEA would not lead to problems of comity or
conflicts with foreign jurisdictions, 0 3 and that failure to apply the act
abroad could undermine Congress' purpose because exclusively
territorial application "invites [the Act's] circumvention. by
10 4
unscrupulous employers.'
After Cleary, Congress amended the ADEA to mandate
extraterritorial application.' 0 5 Even after Congress amended the
statute, however, the courts persisted in finding that the presumption
had not been rebutted, and even refused to accept the amendment as
evidence of Congress' original intent in refusing to retroactively apply

95.
Id. at 248.
96.
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1949).
97.
Turley, supra note 76, at 627.
98.
Turley, supra note 76, at 625.
99.
29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (1976).
100.
Turley, supra note 76, at 625-26.
101.
Cleary v. United States Lines, 555 F. Supp. 1251 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd, 728
F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
102.
Id. at 1263.
103.
Id. at 1259.
104.
Id. at 1263. This stands in contrast to the criminal cases where the courts
disregard the presumption in an attempt to effectuate the purpose of the statute. See
infra notes 166-76.
105.
Turley, supra note 76, at 625.
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the amendment extraterritorially.1 0 6 The Fifth Circuit even went so
far as to determine that the fact of Congress' amendment indicated
clear original congressional intent not to apply the ADEA
0 7
extraterritorially.
Title VII contained "boilerplate" language that is also found in
the Sherman Act and in the securities statutes. In Aramco, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that the language was ambiguous, and because
such language could be found in other statutes that are not held to
apply abroad, the Court held that the language did not represent any
intent on Congress' part to apply the statute extraterritorially.' 0 8
Environmental legislation is universally thought to apply only in
domestic situations.10 9 This is not necessarily due to the presumption
against extraterritorial application, but because Congress has
frequently made explicit its intent to apply the statutes
domestically. 110
Nevertheless, controversy does surround the
treatment of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). 111
The NEPA contains no substantive requirements; it operates only
procedurally. 112
It requires federal agencies to create an
environmental impact statement for any major federal project or

106.
Id. at 625-26.
107.
DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir.
1986). See also Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 1985). The
court refused to apply the ADEA extraterritorially because of ambiguous congressional
intent, stating that,
the legislative history of the 1984 amendment leaves totally obscure whether
the amendment was meant to change the law, to state more clearly the original
meaning of the law, or perhaps just to limit the extraterritorial application of
the Act (to American citizens employed by American corporations or their
subsidiaries in countries that do not have inconsistent laws).
Id.
If Congress had not amended the act, the force of the presumption against
extraterritoriality would have continued, and the act would never have been applied
abroad. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used similar reasoning. See
generally id. The court argued that congressional debate surely would have ensued
had there been any thought of applying the act abroad originally; the court understood
the lack of any such debate to be an indication that Congress had not even considered
the extraterritorial application. Id. However, the court then reasoned away the lack of
debate of the amendment declaring extraterritoriality, stating that this was only an
indication of the trivial nature of the amendment. Id.
108.
See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
(Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1991).
109.
Maj. Mark R. Ruppert, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Enviormental Offenses
Committed Overseas: How to Maximize and When to Say "No", 40 A.F. L. REV. 1, 14
(1996).
110.
See generally id. at 14-16 (reviewing the definitions of environment, and
the statements of purpose from various environmental statutes including CERCLA and
the CAA).
111.
Id. at 16.
112.
Id.
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NEPA's
actions "significantly affecting the requirement."'1 3
processes are designed to gather information on environmental
114
impacts, not necessarily to prohibit the proposed action.
Furthermore, the NEPA lacks any statements by Congress to suggest
a strictly territorial application. The military has repeatedly been
confronted with situations in which the NEPA could be considered to
restrain its activities abroad. For example, in Greenpeace USA v.
Stone, 115 the Department of the Army's attempt to remove chemical
munitions from the Federal Republic of Germany was challenged by
The Army prepared environmental
environmental groups. 1 16
documents for the high seas and U.S. portions of the transport, but
did not formally examine the environmental impacts of transporting
the munitions within Germany. 117 Greenpeace's challenge to the
Army's activities relied upon an extraterritorial application of the
NEPA." 8 The U.S. district court noted the possible conflicts with
Germany's sovereign right to regulate such activities within its own
borders, 119 and did not apply the NEPA. 120 The court went beyond
simply recognizing Germany's sovereignty within its own borders,
and further held that the presumption against extraterritoriality
should operate to prevent any interference with a state's territorial
12 1
integrity.
While Congress did not explicitly authorize extraterritorial
application of the NEPA, arguably it did express such intent through
the use of broad, sweeping language calling for global environmental
An executive order sought to formally establish
protection. 122
extraterritorial application of the NEPA, but added exceptions for
situations where the foreign state is participating with the United
States or not otherwise involved with the action. 123 Under a simple
application of the presumption, the act probably would have been
limited territorially.
In Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) v.
Massey, however, the D.C. Circuit applied three major criteria beyond
congressional intent to determine whether an exception to the

113.
Id.
114.
Royal C. Gardner, Taking the Principle of Just Compensation Abroad:
Private PropertyRights, National Sovereignty, and the Cost of Environment Protection,
65 U. CIN. L. REV. 539, 569 (1997).

115.
Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990).
116.
Id. at 752-54.
117.
Id. at 753-54.
118.
Id. at 745.
Gardner, supra note 114, at 569.
119.
Greenpeace, 748 F. Supp. at 760.
120.
121.
Gardner, supra note 114, at 569.
122.
Silvia M. Riechel, Governmental Hyprocrisy and the Extraterritorial
Application of NEPA, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 115, 130 (1994).
123.
Exec. Order No. 12114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 9, 1979). These provisions
should have protected against possible infringements on the sovereignty of the host
country.
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presumption against extraterritoriality is appropriate: (1) whether
adverse effects in the United States will result from a lack of
extraterritorial application, 124 (2) whether extraterritorial application
will cause international discord, and (3) whether the conduct sought
to be regulated occurs in U.S. territory. 125 The court imported the
examination of "adverse effects" from prior application of the
presumption in other parts of the law.

B. The "Effects Test"Exception to the PresumptionAgainst
Extraterritorialityin Antitrust and Securities Law
The old, broadly restrictive rule against extraterritoriality was
essentially swept aside in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(Alcoa).1 26 This case adopted Judge Learned Hand's "effects"' 27 test.
Alcoa attempted to monopolize the international market of aluminum
ingot. The government attempted to use the Sherman Antitrust Act
to restrain Alcoa's anticompetitive practices that took place beyond
the borders of the United States. 128 While the Sherman Act is silent
on the extraterritorial question, the Act expressly makes illegal any
restraint of trade or commerce "among the several States, or with
foreign nations."'1 29 Judge Hand did not rely on this language in
applying the act extraterritorially,
We are not to read general words, such as those in [the Sherman] Act,
without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon
the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to
those fixed by the "Conflict of Laws." We should not impute to Congress
an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has
1 30
no consequences within the United States.

Hand focused neither on the language of the statute, nor on its
legislative history, to determine the intent of Congress. 131 Instead,

124.
The court specifically referred to Steele v. Bulova, 334 U.S. 280 (1952)
(trademark), United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (antitrust), and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968)
(securities).
125.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
126.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
127.
The Hand effects test closely follows the jurisdictional rule for U.S.
interstate criminal law found in Strassheim v. Milton Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)
(stating that "acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he
had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its
power").
128.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
129.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2002).
130.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
131.
Id.
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Hand speculated as to what conduct Congress probably intended to
reach. 132 He assumed that Congress "certainly did not intend" the
Act to cover "agreements made beyond our borders not intended to
affect imports. '133 He also rejected extraterritorial application of
agreements intended to have an effect on imports, but actually
lacking any such effect. 134 Hand concluded that the Act covers
agreements "intended to affect imports or exports" that could be
"shown actually to have had some effect upon them.' 1 35 The effects
test was not grounded upon any language from Congress; Hand only
assumed that Congress would have wished to apply the statute
136
extraterritorially in order to protect the U.S. marketplace.
This effects test became the standard applied to most marketoriented cases-both in antitrust and securities law-and resulted in
a sharp increase in the number of extraterritorial actions. 137 Courts
gradually came to apply the "effects doctrine" to permit liability
under U.S. antitrust laws whenever an actual or presumed
138
anticompetitive effect on U.S. markets could be shown.
Ultimately, the extension of the extraterritorial reach of antitrust law
did not result from congressional amendment to the legislation, or
any change in apparent congressional intent, but rather from "new

132.

Id.

133.
134.

Id.
Id.

That situation might be thought to fall within the doctrine that intent may be
thought to be a substitute for performance in the case of a contract made within
the United States; or it might be thought to fall within the doctrine that a
statute should not be interpreted to cover acts abroad which have no
consequences here.
Id. at 443-44.
135.
Id. at 444. This was a departure from the U.S. Supreme Court precedent
cited by Hand. Previously, the cases involved agents sent into the United States to
effect the performance of the anticompetitive agreements. Hand stated that an agent
"does not differ from an inanimate means" of effecting the anticompetitive purpose. Id.
136.
The Ninth Circuit discussed an expanded approach to the effects test in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). The
court proposed a three-part test in antitrust cases. First, does the alleged conduct
affect, or is it intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the United States? Second, is
the conduct's type and magnitude sufficient to recognize it as a violation of U.S.
antitrust law? Third, do matters of comity and fairness outweigh the U.S. interest in
regulation?
Id.
For a further discussion of the test, see Joseph J. Norton,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction from a Differing Perspective: Section 416 of the
Restatement (Third) and "Jurisdictionto Regulate Activities Related to Securities," in
COMMENTARIES ON THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES 52 (ABA Section of International Law and Practice 1992).
137.
Turley, supra note 76, at 611.
138.
Id. It has been suggested that the effects test is only part of an analysis for
an exception to the presumption. The Ninth Circuit stated that the "effects test by
itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations' interests. Timberlane
Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 611-12.
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economic realities and regulatory demands, and more directly from
the perceived changes in principles of public international law,
conflict of laws thinking and state practice that followed this
39
evolution.'
Most extraterritoriality disputes in securities cases involve
alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act's (SEA) antifraud
provisions that prohibit any person from using the means and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce to effect fraudulent
securities transactions. 140 In the securities context, the effects test is
based on the presumption that Congress must have intended to
protect the U.S. marketplace from foreign misconduct or from
misconduct originating abroad. 14 1 In addition, securities cases have
14 2
also applied the "conduct" test.
The conduct test is a subjective theory of territoriality that
broadens the basis for extraterritoriality. 14 3 Applying this test,
conduct would be actionable under the SEA regardless of where the
effect took place. 144 The conduct test allows actions to be brought
wherever conduct in the United States facilitated the sales in
question. This test has been applied at the circuit level, most often
where U.S. instrumentalities of commerce were utilized, even if the
stock was not listed in the United States and was not sold in the
145
United States.
C. Implied CongressionalIntent and the Role of the Effects Test in the
ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. CriminalLaw
A longstanding principle of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is
that the government has the authority to criminalize certain

139.
Gary Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 31 (1992).
140.
Turley, supra note 76, at 614.
141.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 416 (1987). The Second Circuit has held that where "extraterritorial
application of the Act is necessary to protect American investors," the presumption
against extraterritoriality does not represent a "Congressional intent to preclude
application of the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in the United
States which are effected outside the United States." Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968).
142.
Turley, supra note 76, at 614.
143.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES §§ 17, 18 (1965); Turley, supra note 76, at 615-16.
144.
Turley, supra note 76, at 616.
145.
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1337-39 (2d Cir. 1972).
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activities of its subjects even beyond its borders. 146 Congress' intent
to apply a criminal law to U.S. citizens abroad out to be plain on the
face of the statute. The U.S. Supreme Court has made no exception
to the presumption against extraterritoriality for criminal acts.
Therefore, a clearly expressed congressional intent should be required
for extraterritorial application.
In reality, the circuits have displayed a willingness to find
extraterritorial application even where neither the statute relied
upon nor the legislative history gave any indication of a congressional
intent for extraterritorial application.14 7 These cases seem to rely
upon a combination of two of the bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction
found in international law: the nationality 148 basis and the effects
doctrine.149
In United States v. Baker,150 the Fifth Circuit upheld the
conviction of a defendant who was found in possession of a controlled
substance. The defendant was caught at sea, beyond the territorial
waters of the United States, presumably on his way to the United
States. 151 The court relied on the reasoning that "the power to
control efforts to introduce illicit drugs into the United States from
the high seas and foreign nations is a necessary incident to Congress'
efforts to eradicate all drug trafficking."'1 52 The court completely
ignored the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Instead, it
essentially relied upon a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality.
The Court reasoned that "absent an express intention on the face of
the statute to [reach extraterritorially], the exercise of that power
may be inferred from the nature of the offense and Congress' other

146.

H. Lowell Brown, The ExtraterritorialReach of the U.S. Government's

CampaignAgainst InternationalBribery, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 407, 417
(1999).

It is conceded that the legislation of every country is territorial; that beyond its
own territory, it can only affect its own subjects or citizens ....
The rights of
war may be exercised on the high seas, because is carried on upon the high
seas; but the pacific rights of sovereignty must be exercised within the territory
of the sovereign.
Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279 (1808).
147.
See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980)
(construing a law against distribution and possession of construed substances to apply
where the defendant was found at sea, beyond the territorial limits of U.S. waters);
United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1990) (construing the Federal
Child Pornography Act to apply extraterritorially).
148.
Thomas, 893 F.2d at 1068-69.
149.
Baker, 609 F.2d at 136-37.
150.
Id. at 134.
151.
While the defendant was outside of the three-mile territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, it was within the "customs waters" of the United States. Id. at 135.
The court treated the question as one of extraterritorial application, and ignored any
possible "customs waters" distinction. Id.
152.
Id. at 137.
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legislative efforts to eliminate the type of crime involved."'1 53 This
strongly resembles an application of the effects test,15 4 though it was
not couched in the same language. The court's chief concern was
apparently that the defendant would have effectuated the harm
Congress wished to regulate if given the opportunity. 155 Given the
particular circumstances of this case, it appeared certain that the
territory of the United States would have been affected by the
defendant's actions.
In United States v. Thomas, the Ninth Circuit followed a line of
reasoning similar to the Fifth Circuit's in Baker.156 The court first
examined the type of crime involved, and it concluded that the
congressional intent to eliminate the proscribed activity could
realistically be served only by extraterritorial application of the
statute. 1 57 The court found that through its statutes, Congress had
158
set up a scheme to eradicate the sexual exploitation of children.
That scheme involved prohibiting the transportation, mailing, and
receipt of child pornography. 159 By "[p]unishing the creation of child
pornography outside the United States that is actually, is intended to
be, or may be reasonably expected to be transported in interstate or
foreign commerce," the executive branch and courts could more
effectively accomplish Congress' ultimate intent. 160 Here, the court's
reasoning reached into territory beyond that of Hand's original effects
test. Hand required both an intention to cause a harm in the United
States and an actual effect in the United States. The Thomas court's
reasoning applied to antitrust law would allow for the prosecution of
a corporation that conspired to commit antitrust violations in the U.S.
market, but had not yet accomplished the effect on the U.S.
marketplace; Hand had rejected just this result in dicta in Alcoa.
The First Circuit used an effects test analysis to provide support
for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction under the Sherman Antitrust

153.
Id. at 136.
154.
This use of the effects test is contrary to Turley's hypothesized market/nonmarket distinction.
155.
Baker, 609 F.2d at 136-37.
156.
United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1066 (5th Cir. 1990).
157.
Id. Interestingly, the Mann Act that makes it a felony to travel across state
lines for sexually immoral purposes was amended in 1994 to specifically apply to those
who travel outside of the United States to engage in sexual activities that are illegal
inside the United States. Eric Thomas Berkman, Responses to the InternationalChild
Sex Tourism Trade, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 397, 415 (1996). This seems to
indicate either that Congress did not intend for the courts to view similar criminal
statutes as having an extraterritorial reach lacking specific authorization, or that
Congress approved of the extraterritorial application but was unwilling to assume that
courts would apply the same reasoning in the future.
158.
Thomas, 893 F.2d at 1068. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2257.
159.
Thomas, 893 F.2d at 1068.
160.
Id. at 1068-69.
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Act. 16 1 The court analogized from a U.S. Supreme Court decision
regarding a state's "authority for applying a state's criminal statute
to conduct occurring entirely outside the state's borders.' 162 "Acts
done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of
the harm as if he had been present at the effect."'163 The First Circuit
said that "it is not much of a stretch to apply1 64this same principle
internationally, especially in a shrinking world."'
The First Circuit has rejected any distinction between criminal
and civil extraterritoriality.165 The court has held there is no
presumption against
strength
of the
in the
difference
extraterritoriality where criminal rather than civil liability is in
166
question.
D. Exception for Crimes and FraudsAgainst the U.S. Government
The Second Circuit has held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is probably inoperative in cases involving crimes
against the U.S. government.' 67 A statute prohibiting crimes against
the U.S. government "may be applied even in the absence of 'clear
evidence' that Congress so intended."'168 This reasoning is logically
connected to that of the effects test. Here, it is simply assumed that a
fraud against the U.S. government necessarily has an effect within
U.S. territory; thus, the harm requirement of the effects test is
satisfied.' 69 The principle of automatic extraterritoriality for crimes
against the U.S. government is derived from the Supreme Court
decision United States v. Bowman. 170 Bowman dealt with a fraud
committed by a U.S. citizen against the U.S. government while
abroad." 71 The Court recognized an important difference between
criminal statutes passed to maintain order within a given

161.
United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997).
162.
Id.
163.
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
164.
Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 6 (citing Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730
F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying the Strassheim principle to conduct in
Malaysia involving drugs intended for distribution in the United States), cert denied,
470 U.S. 1031 (1985)); see also United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1981).
165.
Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 6.
166.
Id.
167.
United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 211 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id.
168.
169.
One could ask in what way harm to the U.S. government is different from
the harm suffered by a U.S. citizen or a U.S. corporation abroad. Why is the harm
suffered by the U.S. government acting abroad automatically connected to the U.S.
government at home, while U.S. citizens are treated differently under labor law
depending on where in the world they stand?
170.
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922).
171.
Id. at 94.
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community, such as the nation at large, 1 7 2 and those designed to
address a particular harm, irrespective of where the action causing
the harm occurs. 17 3
The Court emphasized the right of the
government "to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever
perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens. ' 1 74
In
language similar to that of the effects test, the Court found an
implied intent on the part of Congress: "Congress has not thought it
necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall
include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be
inferred from the nature of the offense. 1 7 5 The courts have continued
to infer such an intent. 1 7 6

172.
173.

Now, false statements made to the U.S.

Id. at 97-98.
Id.

The necessary locus, when not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of
Congress as evidenced by the description and nature of the crime and upon the
territorial limitations upon the power and jurisdiction of a government to
punish crime under the law of nations. Crimes against private individuals or
their property, like assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson,
embezzlement and fraud of all kinds, which affect the peace and good order of
the community, must of course be committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the government where it may properly exercise it. If punishment of them is
to be extended to include those committed outside of the strict territorial
jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do
so will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard. We have an example of
this in the attempted application of the prohibitions of the Anti-Trust Law to
acts done by citizens of the United States against other such citizens in a
foreign country. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909). That was a civil case, but as the statute is criminal as well as civil, it
presents an analogy. But the same rule of interpretation should not be applied
to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their
locality for the Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right
of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever
perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers or agents.
Some such offenses can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Government because of the local acts required to constitute them. Others
are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be
greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large
immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in
foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not thought it
necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the
high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of
the offense.
Id.
174.
175.
176.
infra note

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1986), dicussed
177.
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government, even if they are made outside the borders of the United
177
States, are punishable under U.S. law.
E. Does the PresumptionAgainst ExtraterritorialitySurvive the
Chevron Deference Approach?
The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
relationship between the presumption against extraterritoriality and
the deference standard established in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.178 In Foley Bros., which predated the
creation of the Chevron test, the Court examined an administrative
interpretation of the law as evidence of congressional intent. 179 An
employee of a U.S. government contractor operating in Iran and Iraq
brought suit under the U.S. Eight Hour Law 80 claiming that he was
improperly not paid for overtime work. In support of extraterritorial
application of the law, the plaintiff pointed to an executive order that
suspended the law with respect to laborers employed by the
8
government at Atlantic military bases leased from Great Britain.' '
Arguably, the executive order would have been issued only if the
executive branch understood Congress to have meant the statute to
apply extraterritorially.
The Court concluded, however, that the order might have been
issued on the assumption that the bases were sufficiently under the
control of the government that the Eight Hour Law would apply

177.
Walczak, 783 F.2d at 854. In this case, the court did not apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality. The court neither examined the statutory
language for a suggestion of extraterritoriality, nor looked to the legislative history of
the statute in question. Instead, it relied upon the assumption made in Bowman that
Congress would not feel it necessary to explicitly apply such a statute abroad. The
court cited Bowman for the proposition "that some offenses are such that to limit their
locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and
usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily
committed on the high seas and in foreign countries." Id.
178.
Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV.
649, 691 (2000). The doctrine of court deference to agency interpretations originated in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Ref. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Jeana L.
Goosman, Christensen v. Harris Country: When Rejecting Chevron Deference The
Supreme Court Correctly Clarifiedan UnclearIssue, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 753 (2001).
179.
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 288-90 (1949).
180.
The law provided that
[elvery contract made to which the United States . . . is a party . . . shall

contain a provision that no laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work
contemplated by the contract, in the employ of the contractor or any
subcontractor ... shall be required or permitted to work more than eight hours
in any one calendar day upon such work.
Id. at 282 (emphasis added). The law further required that any work beyond the eighthour limit should be compensated at a rate one-and-one-half times the basic rate of
pay. Id. at 283.
181.
Id. at 288.
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under a separate theory of territoriality found in the Court's decision
in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell.182 This level of ambiguity was
sufficient for the Court to find that no clear congressional
authorization had been granted. 183 The Court more favorably viewed
conclusions by the Attorney General and the Comptroller General
that the law should not be applied to foreign employees of U.S.
corporations abroad. 184 The Court concluded that because the statute
did not differentiate between foreign laborers and U.S.-citizen
laborers, and the Attorney General and Comptroller General both
thought that foreign laborers were not included under the statute,
that the law could not apply to one group but not the other on foreign
18 5
soil.
The U.S. Supreme Court found the presumption against
extraterritoriality effective in Aramco despite the EEOC's conclusion
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should have been given an
extraterritorial application in the case of U.S. citizen employees
employed by U.S. corporations. 1 86 The Court, however, avoided
potential conflict with Chevron deference by concluding that
"Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC
authority to promulgate rules or regulations." 18 7 Because the EEOC
lacks rule-making authority, it is not entitled to the Chevron level of
deference. Therefore, Chevron deference would not apply and the
level of deference actually afforded to the EEOC's intepretation of
Title VII would "depend upon the thoroughness of evidence of its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.' u8 8 Petitioners argued
that the Court ought to defer to longstanding EEOC guidelines
interpreting the statute as protecting U.S. citizens employed
abroad. 189
The majority found, however, that the EEOC's
interpretation had changed since the statute was first enacted. 190
While this lack of consistency did not lead the majority to "wholly

Id.; see also Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
182.
183.
Id.
184.
Id.
Id. at 288-89.
185.
186.
See generally Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 244 (1991) (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 does not apply extraterritorially in regulating employment practices).
187.
Id. at 257.
188.
Id. at 257 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). The
court found that EEOC's interpretation "does not fare well under these standards." Id.
The EEOC's position contradicted its earlier position that the statute was limited to
domestic protection, and provided no explanation for its change in judgment. Id.
Gibney & Emerick, supra note 72, at 131.
189.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 257-58.
190.
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discount" the EEOC's position, the Court did find that it left the
EEOC's interpretation with too little weight "to overcome the
presumption against extraterritorial application." 191 Given these
circumstances, it is unclear whether the Court would have reached a
different conclusion had it afforded the EEOC Chevron deference, or
given the EEOC's conclusions greater weight under the Skidmore
standard. 192
In a concurrence, Justice Scalia stated that he would have
accorded Chevron deference to the EEOC regarding its interpretation
of Title VII. 1 93 In his Chevron analysis, however, Justice Scalia
would have incorporated the presumption against extraterritoriality
as a factor in examining the reasonableness of the agency's
interpretation of its authorizing statute. 194 Scalia stated that the
need for Congress to clearly express its intent to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality "would create a higher burden
for the agency in demonstrating the validity of its position."'195 In
fact, this would nullify the deference in a Chevron deference analysis.
Without a "clearly expressed" congressional intent in favor of
extraterritoriality, the agency could never reasonably conclude that
the law applied extraterritorially. This would essentially substitute a
requirement of clear congressional authorization for the reasonable
interpretation of the agency. Thus, presumably, the Court would
have the power to make the final determination of whether
congressional intent was "clearly expressed." Under Scalia's analysis,
Chevron deference would be completely undermined, leaving the
Chevron deference approach operative in name only.
The dissent in Aramco was unclear as to the level of deference it
would afford the EEOC in its interpretation of the statute. 19 6 The
dissent stated that "there is no reason not to give effect to the
considered and consistently expressed views" of the relevant
agencies. 197 However, it neither exclusively relied on the agencies'
interpretations, nor cited Chevron in discussing the weight of the
198
agencies' interpretations.
There has been mixed circuit court authority addressing Chevron
deference and extraterritoriality.199
In two decisions predating
Aramco, both involving independent government agencies, the D.C.
Circuit held that the presumption against extraterritoriality

191.
192.
193.

Id.
Bradley, supra note 178, at 692.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring).

194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 260-78

197.
198.
199.

Id. at 278.
Id. at 260-78.
Bradley, supra note 178, at 692.
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superseded Chevron deference. 200 The Second Circuit, however,
more recently found that Chevron deference did apply to the SEC's
20 1
extraterritorial application of a statute.
The U.S. Supreme Court has said that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is designed to spur Congress to address issues of
extraterritoriality more directly. 20 2 The principle reason for this
appears to be the Court's belief that Congress is institutionally better
situated than the judiciary to determine whether and to what extent
U.S. law should apply abroad. 20 3 It has also been suggested that the
presumption against extraterritoriality should override Chevron
deference because "extraterritorial application calls for extremely
sensitive judgments involving international relations; such judgments
must be made via the ordinary lawmaking process (in which the
President of course participates). The executive may not make this
decision on its own. ' 20 4 The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that
Congress is "able to calibrate its provisions in a way that we
cannot. '20 5 The Court may avoid issues that it feels ill equipped to
resolve, or that too closely resemble policy-making. 20 6 Additionally,
the Court has expressed concern at the prospect of "running
interference in such a delicate field of international relations. '20 7 The
Court does not necessarily prefer congressional interpretation to
executive interpretation; it primarily wishes to remove certain issues
from determination by the courts. 208 In this respect, the Court has no
reason not to give an agency interpretation of extraterritoriality
deference if it would do so were the issue not one of
extraterritoriality.

200.
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Companie de Saint Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1322-23 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
201.
See Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas
London, 147 F.3d 118, 123 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 199 S.Ct. 1029 (1999).
202.
Curtis A Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 550-55 (1997).

203.
Bradley, supra note 178, at 693.
204.
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 333
(2000).
205.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco),
499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991).
206.
Bradley, supra note 178, at 694.
207.
Benz v.Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
208.
Bradley, supra note 178, at 694.
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IV. THE FDA's POWER TO REGULATE U.S. DRUG RESEARCH ABROAD IS
LIMITED

A. The Food, Drug,and Cosmetic Act Does Not Exhibit a "Clearly
Expressed" CongressionalIntent for ExtraterritorialApplication
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) includes the
same "boilerplate language" of interstate commerce as the ADEA.
The "Prohibited Acts" section of the statute 20 9 refers to the
"introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of
any article in violation of section . . . 21 USCS 355 (New Drug
Application)."
The term "interstate commerce" is defined as
"commerce between any State or Territory and any place outside
thereof," while "State" means "any State or Territory of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto
2 10
Rico."
The Section of the FDCA that grants rulemaking and
enforcement authority to the FDA does not express clearly whether
Congress desired the FDA to have an extraterritorial reach in its
regulatory powers. 211 It does suggest that the FDA be afforded some
degree of ability to act internationally. The mission of the FDA is to
(1)
promote the public health by promptly and efficiently reviewing
clinical research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of
regulated products in a timely manner;
(2)
with respect to such products, protect the public health by
ensuring that(A) foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly labeled;
(B) human and veterniary drugs are safe and effective; ....
(3)
participate through appropriateprocesses with representative of
other countries to reduce the burden of regulation, harmonize
regulatory
requirements,
and
achieve
appropriate
reciprocal
arrangements; and
(4)
as determined to be
paragraphs (1) through (3)
medicine, and public health,
manufacturers, importers,
212
regulated products.

209.
210.
211.
212.

appropriate by the Secretary, carry out
in consultation with experts in science,
and in cooperation with consumers, users,
packers, distributors, and retailers of

21 U.S.C. § 331 (1997).
21 U.S.C. § 321(a) & (b) (1997).
See generally 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2001).
21 U.S.C. § 393 (1997) (emphasis added).
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This language does not establish whether the FDA's regulatory
authority should extend abroad. While it says that the FDA should
''participate
through
appropriate
processes"
with
foreign
governments, this probably does not rise to the level of a "clearly
expressed" intent to enforce the FDCA extraterritorially, or to
produce regulations that would apply extraterritorially. 2 13
Even
under a very narrow reading of the statute, however, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that the FDA possesses some capacity for action
beyond the borders of the United States. The FDA is clearly
authorized to work with its counterpart agencies in other countries to
bring drugs to market faster. Still, this is not a "clearly expressed"
congressional intent to allow the FDA to exercise its regulatory
powers abroad.
The FDA's past treatment of foreign research data does not
support extraterritorial application.
The FDA's inconsistent
treatment of foreign research data is similar to the EEOC's
inconsistent treatment of the Civil Rights Act as discussed in
Aramco.214 In 1962, the FDA first told the pharmaceutical industry
that data from foreign clinical studies would be acceptable; however,
at that time the data could be used only as a supplemental
demonstration of the drug's safety and efficacy. 215 Foreign clinical
studies could not serve as primary evidence of a drug's safety and
efficacy until 1975.216 At that time, the data became acceptable only
in unusual cases. 217 In 1984, in response to pressure from the
pharmaceutical industry and foreign governments, and in recognition
of rising scientific standards abroad, the FDA finally elevated foreign
research data to a status similar to that of domestic data. 218 This
evolution reflects a FDA policy shift, not an agency interpretation of
congressional intent.
It seems unlikely that the current FDA

213.
The FDA has, however, expressed an interest in using international
inspections to foster "effective international agreements."
US FDA Looks to
Leveraging, supra note 71.
The FDA also hopes to "leverage the energies of
collaborators such as states." Id. This seems to fall within the FDA's mandate from
Congress, but how the FDA would go about executing such strategies is very unclear.
214.
See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
(Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1991).
215.
John J. Gorski, An FDA-EEC Perspective on the InternationalAcceptance of
Foreign Clinical Data, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 329, 333 (1991). Foreign research data
could not directly support the approval of a new drug.
216.
Id.
217.
Id. The data was only acceptable if the drug in question was a major
advancement, for an uncommon disease, or resulted in a strikingly favorable benefitrisk ratio. Id.
218.
Julie Relihan, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS Drugs: An International
Approach, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229, 251 (1995). The FDA hoped that avoiding
unnecessary repetition of clinical studies would reduce the length of the drug approval
process. Gorski, supra note 215, at 332.
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interpretation would be afforded Chevron deference under these
circumstances.
A
general
application
of. the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality found in Aramco would likely weigh against
allowing the FDA to have an extraterritorial reach. Nothing in the
FDA's authorizing statute expresses a clear congressional intent in
favor of extraterritoriality. In fact, there is nothing in the statute
beyond the standard boilerplate language required for Commerce
Clause authorization that easily lends to an interpretation favoring
extraterritorial application. It is the same language that has been
found insufficient in employment and environmental cases. Without
a "clearly expressed" congressional intent to extend the FDA's rulemaking authority abroad, the presumption is not overcome.
B. Under Congress'sStatutory Scheme the FDA Probably Has the
Power to Accept Foreign Research Data
The statutory scheme of the FDA provides a basis for
extraterritorial application of FDA regulations.
In the FDA's
authorizing statute, Congress's expressed intent is to protect U.S.
consumers of drugs. 2 19 Congress mandates that the FDA is to ensure
the safety and efficacy of drugs sold in the United States, while
allowing safe and effective drugs to be brought to market as quickly
as possible. 220 The FDA can best do this by accepting foreign data,
and ensuring its accuracy. By accepting foreign research data, the
FDA can shorten the time required to bring new drugs to market;
U.S. consumers benefit through earlier access to useful drugs. The
benefit derived from allowing foreign testing is that the ready
availability, and lower cost, of foreign test subjects allows drug
companies to seek approval with less unnecessary delay, and with
less duplication of costs. 2 2 1 Merely accepting research data from
studies conducted abroad is probably not an extraterritorial reach by
222
the FDA.

219.
21 U.S.C. § 393 (containing repeated references to "promoting" and
"protecting" "public health").
220.
The FDA is noted for having a regulatory culture that "emphasizes the
agency's needs for useful findings on efficacy and safety which will enable it to make
regulatory decisions that are factually supportable and otherwise credible." Michael
Baram, Perspectives on Medical Error:Reactions to the IOM Report, 27 AM. J.L. & MED.
253, 259 (2001).
221.
Dominquez-Urban, supra note 29, at 266.
222.
Under this rationale, however, it is hard to argue that foreign research
should have different, lower procedural requirements than experiments conducted in
the United States. Any regulations that function to ensure reliable data should apply
equally regardless of the location of the study. The exception would be those
requirements that go toward ensuring test subject safety.
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The FDA's decision to allow foreign research data could also be
considered to run counter to the FDA's mission of ensuring safety and
reliability. Foreign research has proven far more difficult to monitor
This increases the likelihood that
than domestic research. 22 3
unreliable data could be used to support new drug approval, thus
threatening the health of U.S. consumers. "Until the FDA began
accepting foreign data to support applications for approval of new
pharmaceutical products, there was little likelihood of harm to
consumers from unsafe and ineffective drugs." 224 If a court were to
determine that the FDA was incorrect to balance these factors in
favor of accepting foreign research data under their Congressional
authorization, the decision to allow drug testing abroad could fail
under a Chevron approach, thus making the remaining question of
the FDA's power to then regulate that testing moot.
C. If the FDA Can Accept ForeignResearch Data, Then it Can Take
Steps to Ensure the Efficacy of the Tests and the Reliability of the
Data
A promising argument for extraterritoriality springs from
Bowman. Assuming that the FDA can accept foreign research data,
further problems with drug testing abroad can generally be split into
(1) concerns over the reliability of data and
two categories:
experimental rigorousness and (2) concerns for the human rights of
human test subjects. Under Bowman, a strong argument can be
made that the FDA has implicit authorization from Congress to
regulate testing because of its responsibility to ensure the validity of
the results of experimentation. Bowman specifically involved a fraud
perpetrated against a corporation entirely held by the U.S.
government. 225 The U.S. Supreme Court relied heavily on the
government's implicit interest in protecting itself against fraud or
Improprieties in drug testing, amounting to
obstruction. 226
misrepresentations of test data to the FDA, would fall under the
same category. A failure to allow the FDA to take steps, including
bringing regulatory or criminal actions against drug companies to
help to ensure the validity of experimental data, would render the
statute essentially null for whatever companies have the resources to
test abroad.
The effects test also supports allowing the FDA to regulate
abroad for the purpose of ensuring reliable research data. The

223.
224.
225.
226.

See infra notes 29-47.
Dominguez-Urban, supra note 29, at 266.
See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
Id.
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relationship between potential bad acts committed abroad such as
falsification of drug research data obtained abroad with a harm to
U.S. citizens is probably more clearly cognizable than in antitrust or
securities law, and almost certainly clearer than in labor or
environmental law. If flawed foreign research data were used to
support a new drug application, U.S. consumers could certainly be
harmed by ineffective or even dangerous drugs.
Bowman's
effectiveness, however, is limited to the problem of reliability of data
and experimental procedures; it does not provide a basis for
protecting the rights of human test subjects abroad.
D. The FDA Probably Lacks the Authority to Regulate the Treatment
of Human Subjects in ForeignClinical Drug Trials
Even assuming that the FDA has the authority to accept foreign
research data, the FDA probably lacks the authority to protect
human test subjects abroad. Under the FDCA, an applicant seeking
to introduce a new drug into interstate commerce must provide the
Secretary of Health and Human Services with a full description of the
design and size of the clinical trials that will be used. 227 By itself this
is not the same as authorizing the FDA to prescribe the methodology
to be employed by researchers, particularly where the safety of
human research subjects is concerned. The FDA's regulations for
testing conducted by, or in conjunction with, federal departments and
agencies specifically differentiate between procedures used to protect
human subjects in the United States and procedures used in foreign
countries. 228 Given this discrepancy, 229 it seems difficult to argue
that the protection of human subjects is a necessary part of ensuring
valid experimental data. Under the FDA's regulations, protecting
human subjects instead seems to be a more supplemental government
interest.
For testing conducted neither through a federal agency nor
under an IND, the FDA regulations exercise jurisdiction over

227.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(4)(B) (1997).
228.
45 C.F.R. § 46.101(h) (2001). The FDA regulations also prescribe different
levels of scrutiny and care depending on whether government funds are used to
support an experiment abroad.
229.
The regulations for foreign drug testing provide a lower level of protection
to human subjects in foreign drug tests than in domestic tests. An example of this is
the use of placebo-comparison drug trials on HIV patients in Africa. The use of
placebos in trials would be considered a substandard level of care in the United States.
However, such practice still conforms with the FDA's foreign clinical trial
requirements. See Robert Mittendorf II, Primum Non Nocere: Implications for the
Globalization of Biomedical Research Trials, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 239, 245
(2001) (discussing allegations made by advocates for Public Citizen that AZT trials in
Africa were unethical because they failed to conform to the U.S. guidelines for its
domestic tests).
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experimentation when the sponsor of a new drug application submits
the results of the foreign clinical studies in support of the new drug
application. 230 The regulatory control requires disclosure of, or access
to, many pieces of information that go to the efficacy of the study and
the reliability of the study results. 231 These requirements include
information related to the researcher or investigator, research
These
facilities, protocol, and individual patient records. 232
requirements all go to ensuring the safety and efficacy of the drug
that may eventually be marketed to the U.S. public. Requirements
pertaining to the safety of the human test subjects have no such
relationship.
There is no effects test basis for regulating the safety of human
test subjects. The health of U.S. consumers will not be affected by a
lack of consent by a patient in a developing-country hospital. The
U.S. marketplace suffers no harm if the potential side effects of a
drug are not explained to research subjects.
The FDA lacks clear congressional authorization for the
promulgation of regulations ensuring the health and safety of human
test subjects abroad. Furthermore, none of the traditional exceptions
to the presumption against extraterritoriality apply to such
regulations. Unless the courts are willing to allow the FDA great
deference under Chevron, the FDA regulations protecting human
research subjects are invalid. There does not seem to be any support
in the FDCA for the proposition that the FDA's regulations have been
a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Thus, FDA lacks the
authority to protect the health and safety of human test subjects
abroad.

V. INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH
SUBJECTS OF MEDICAL TESTING ARE NEEDED

A. The Difficulties of Regulating TransnationalCorporationsin the
Developing World
Developing countries have demonstrated limited capacities and
interest in conducting and monitoring pharmaceutical research in
their territories. 233 Indeed, while most industrialized nations have at

230.
231.

21 C.F.R. § 312.120 (2002).
Id. § 312.120(b).

232.

Id.

See generally International Summit Conference on Bioethics, Towards an
233.
International Ethic for Research with Human Beings (1987), at 69 (noting that the lack
of research on diseases common to the tropics can only be corrected by expanding the
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least some ethical review standards or mechanisms, many developing
countries lack any such protections. 23 4
Generally, developed
countries have provided very little assistance in protecting the rights
of human subjects in developing countries; presently, national
regulations have been given little extraterritorial effect, 235 and there
are no international guidelines that are widely accepted, let alone
enforced. 236
Furthermore, there are no international treaties
237
governing experimentation on humans.
Higher regulatory standards in developed countries serve as
incentives to pharmaceutical corporations to relocate their testing to
developing countries where they face less regulatory pressures and
decreased exposure to product liability. 238 Companies are able to
conduct substantial amounts of research without being required to
obtain any regulatory approval and are able to persuade individual
physicians to conduct clinical trials on new and untested products in
situations where even the physician's institution is unaware. 23 9 Of
course, the riskiest experiments are among the first to be sent
abroad. They are able to flee the burdensome regulations of the
United States to jurisdictions that allow them to do as they please. If
the host country enforces laws the U.S. company dislikes, the
company may simply move on to a more hospitable environment.
Transnational corporations place special burdens on the law.
They are "'de-nationalized' in the sense that they view the world,
rather than their home or host states, as their base of operations. 2 40
Transnational corporations are able to use their multiple facilities in

research capabilities of developing countries). The United States has itself faced
difficulties in protecting human research subjects. See generally Katz, supra note 52.
The FDA regulations do not provide answers to many questions in testing on humans.
See generally Stuart L. Nightingale, Challenges in Human Subject Protection, 50 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 493 (1995). For a summary of the U.S. informed consent regulations, see
id. at 494-95.
234.
Dominguez-Urban, supra note 29, at 270. The United States provides
human subjects with protections through the FDA. Id. The European Union has
adopted the Declaration of Helsinki as its code of ethics for research trials. Id. Japan,
while lagging somewhat behind the European Union and the United States, has
promulgated clinical practice standards to "pay due ethical consideration to the rights
of persons who undergo clinical tests." Dominguez-Urban, supra note 29, at 270; see
also Soji Kodama, PharmaceuticalFirms Revising System to Monitor Drugs, NIKKEI
WKLY., Jan. 18, 1992, at 8.
235.
No countries attempt to ensure the same level of protection for foreign
research subjects as for their own citizens.
Dawn Joyce Miller, Research and
Accountability: The Need for Uniform Regulation of InternationalPharmaceuticalDrug
Testing, PACE INT'L L. REV. 197, 211 (2001).
236.
Dominguez-Urban, supra note 29, at 268.
237.
Erwin Deutsch, Medical Experimentation:InternationalRules and Practice,
19 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 1, 4 (1989).
238.
Dominguez-Urban, supra note 29, at 271.
239.
Id.
240.
Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a
People-Centered TransnationalLegal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 8 (1993).
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order to evade state power and the constraints of national regulatory
schemes. 241 Moreover, the "absence of clear international standards
means that they can also avoid regulation at the international
level. ' 24 2
Thus, large corporations can operate in a largely
unregulated manner.
This unrestrained activity can already be seen in the field of
labor law. 24 3 U.S. corporations acting abroad are not bound by U.S.
health and safety regulations. This restraint of U.S. law is generally
justified by the idea that these matters should be for the host
jurisdiction to decide. If the host country either has little law in the
field, or has a legal system unable or unwilling to enforce the law
244
against U.S. corporations, however, no law governs them at all.
U.S. corporations are able

to employ child labor (even of U.S.
2 45

citizenship) in overseas operations.
Most developing countries lack regulations concerning the
protection of human research subjects. 2 4 6 Extraterritorial application
and enforcement of U.S. regulatory law could be effective in
restraining the activities of U.S.-based corporations.

B. Unilaterally Using U.S. Law to Protect Human Research Subjects
Would Violate the Doctrine of InternationalComity
Extension of U.S.-regulatory law could easily upset international
comity. "International comity is a doctrine that counsels voluntary
forbearance when a sovereign which has a legitimate claim to
jurisdiction concludes that a second sovereign also has a legitimate
' 247
claim to jurisdiction under principles of international law.
Contemporary conceptions of comity situate it somewhere between a

241.
Ratner, supra note 27, at 463 (discussing the ability of corporations to use
their international presence to dodge local human rights regulations). See also
Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 240, at 8.
242.
Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 240, at 9. Transnational corporations
"have grown beyond the control of national governments and operate in a legal and
moral vacuum."
Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for
TransnationalCorporations,25 ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1995).
243.
Gibney & Emerick, supra note 72, at 124-25.
244.
Id. at 139.
245.
Id. at 123.
246.
John Daniels, U.S. Funded AIDS Research in Haiti: Does Geography
Dictate How Closely the United States Government Scrutinizes Human Research
Testing?, 11 ALB.L.J. SCI. & TECH. 203, 213 (2000).
247.
United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1997) (citing
Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionat a Crossroads:An Intersection Between
Public and Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 n.1 (1982)). The
doctrine of international comity is captured in the Restatement (Third) of U.S. Foreign
Relations Law. The Restatement lists eight factors that should be weighed in deciding
whether extraterritoriality is appropriate. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2).
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mere courtesy and an absolute obligation, usually "closer to the
U.S. courts have weighed
courtesy end of the spectrum." 248
international comity as a factor in determining whether to apply U.S.
law abroad without a clear congressional intent. 249 In Hartford
Fire,25 0 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized comity as limiting U.S.
jurisdiction only if compliance with U.S. law would violate foreign
law. 25 1 The doctrine does not have the force of law to limit Congress's
power to legislate extraterritorially.
Some commentators have argued that the courts have been too
concerned with issues of comity. The courts have used "some vague
notion that differences in law necessarily translate into conflicts of
law. '252 At the same time, the Supreme Court has said that no
conflict exists "where a person subject to regulation by two states can
comply with the laws of both. '253 A primary motivation of Aramco,
however, was to avoid "international discord and unintentional
infringements on the sovereignty of other nations. '254 The status of

248.
Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 627, 687 (2001).
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (providing the classic U.S. Supreme Court
statement of the nature of the doctrine).
249.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). The
court recognized the usefulness of a balancing test, given that "it is evident that at
some point the interests of the United States are too weak and the foreign harmony
incentive for restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction."
Id. at 609. "The assertion of jurisdiction by the United States over behavior properly
subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign country is unprecedented in the absence of
significant policy concerns which outweigh the interests of any affected foreign State
regarding such behavior." NYC Bar Report, infra note 279.
250.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1992).
251.
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court held that "effects jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act should be truncated only where foreign law compelled a defendant's
antitrust violation." See Swaine, supra note 248, at 632-33.
252.
Gibney & Emerick, supra note 72, at 134.
253.
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 403, cmt. e). Differences between the laws of nations are not
necessarily conflicts. Gibney & Emerick, supra note 72, at 143-44. A discrepancy
between the prevailing norms in a country and the dictates of U.S. law is not the same
as an actual difference between what the two nations' laws mandate. Id. If two
nations' laws--one local the other extraterritorial-conflicted, conflict could be avoided
if the regulated actor simply followed the more stringent of the two standards. Id.
This contradicts the older standard, wherein if "foreign regulation appropriately
applies to the case before the court, the action will usually be dismissed." Maier, supra
note 247, at 290.
254.
Gardner, supra note 114, at 567.
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international comity under U.S. law appears to remain unsettled, as
the Hartford Fire ruling was apparently limited to antitrust law,
where extraterritorial jurisdiction has long been recognized.
1. U.S. Law Versus the Power of Developing Countries to Legislate
for Themselves
Under basic principles of international law, countries hosting
drug testing should have jurisdiction over experiments conducted in
their territory. 255 Developing countries should be free to set their
own policies regarding research on humans.
Extraterritorial
application of U.S. regulations would essentially rob developing
countries of any flexibility in formulating their own policy and
regulations. Already, developing countries chafe at U.S. policies that
restrict their access to drugs. 25 6 Other governments have often
viewed extraterritorial application of U.S. law as a sign of U.S.
25 7
arrogance or even as interference in their territorial affairs.
Developing nations' governments may wish to promote
experimentation within their borders.
Research brings with it many benefits. First, clinical drug trials may
present the only available treatment for a particular disease. Second,
free medical treatment, increased monitoring, and the attention of
specialists often accompany research. Third..., drugs do not have the
same effect for all populations. If a drug is never tested in one country,
scientists may fail to discover that it would have an effect on its
258
population, and may dismiss it as ineffective.

Also, some commentators have suggested that exporting the
doctrine of informed consent to developing countries, many of which
have more communitarian outlooks than developed countries and
which lack the same concept of "self' or "personhood," amounts to
"ethical imperialism"-an imposition of Western values on non-

255.
In fact, nations have long recognized an obligation to protect their
populations from obvious risks and hazards to their health. Jonathan Wike, The
Marlboro Man in Asia: U.S. Tobacco and Human Rights, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
329, 359 (1996).
256.
"Condemnation of restrictive United States policies is evident from
frequent public demonstrations that express concern about the United States impeding
developing countries from gaining access to essential drugs." Park, supra note 45, at
148.
257.
The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th
Cong. 24 (1975) (statement of Philip A. Loomis, Jr.) (cited in Brown, supra note 146, at
n.9).
258.
Dominguez-Urban, supra note 29, at 275.
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Western cultures. 25 9 For this reason, the right of free consent has
been difficult to implement in some developing countries because
those countries do not generally share the concept of individual rights
held by the West. 260 The notion of individual consent may be foreign
to the culture where the trials are taking place. 26 1 Also, low local
levels of education can make it difficult to determine whether actual
consent has been obtained from an individual, as opposed to
procedural. 262 Procedural consent, in general, can be the only
standard for determining consent. The right of free consent is
263
subjectively evaluated and impractical for large scientific studies.
U.S. regulatory schemes may also be inappropriate because, in
the opinion of some, the West may place too much emphasis on the
formality of obtaining a signature on a consent form, which may
become a substitute for dialogue with the patient.2 6 4 This can be
particularly significant where the pool of potential subjects has a high
265
rate of illiteracy and a low level of education.
2. The Anti-Democratic Force of Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Law
The extraterritorial application of U.S. laws is anti-democratic.
Extraterritorial application of laws amounts to a "perversion of
democratic governance. '"266 Extraterritoriality violates the principle
267
that government ought to rest on the consent of the governed.
Those in foreign countries who may bear the ultimate burden of U.S.
268
It
regulation are powerless to change the statutes or regulations.
is difficult, if not impossible, for foreigners (either in the form of
foreign governments or individual foreigners) to influence the U.S.
political process; they are ineligible to vote in U.S. elections and are
limited in their ability to make monetary contributions to

259.

See generally M.P. Priziosi et al., PracticalExperiences in ObtainingInformed

Consent for a Vaccine Trial in Rural Africa, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 317 (1997); Dominguez-

Urban, supranote 29, at 279.
260.
Fidler, supra note 45, at 337.
261.
Id. The WHO-CIOMS guidelines allow consent by the community leader to
substitute for individual consent. George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of
Human Experimentation: Nuremberg, Helsinki, and Beyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119
(1992).
Fidler, supra note 45, at 338.
262.
263.
Id.
264.
Dominguez-Urban, supra note 29, at 281.
265.
Id. at 271-72.
266.
Gibney & Emerick, supranote 72, at 133.
267.
Id.
268.
Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The
Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the
Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 297,
312-13 (1996).
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participants in the political system. 269
Also, foreigners face
potentially insurmountable obstacles of logistics and judicial
jurisdiction should they attempt to challenge a provision of U.S. law
through the courts. 270 It would be difficult for a foreign entity to gain
standing in order to challenge a U.S. statute being applied to them,
and it would be nearly impossible to challenge the inapplicability of a
statute.
It should be noted that several of the arguments against U.S.
extraterritorial application that work from the view that it is antidemocratic and anti-imperialistic would not apply in the realm of
drug testing. First, the United States is often criticized because
"protection of the law has generally not followed enforcement of the
law. 12 71 Here, particularly in the realm of human rights, protection
of the law and enforcement of the law would be one and the same.
The goal of the law's enforcement would be for the protection (albeit
to the extent that it is judged appropriate by the United States) of
those in foreign countries. Second, the United States has been
criticized for giving itself one set of standards to follow, while those
who live in other countries may be constrained by a different set of
standards, but still under U.S. law. 272 The exact purpose here would
be to afford foreigners the same level of protection from
(predominantly U.S.) drug companies that U.S. citizens enjoy. Third,
U.S. extraterritoriality has been accused of treating similarly
situated individuals unequally. 273 Currently, the FDA's application
is triggered by the location of the experiment and the experiment
sponsor's intention to introduce the experimental results in seeking
FDA approval, not by the citizenship of the participants in the
study. 274 There are no special FDA provisions for U.S. citizens
participating in experiments abroad, nor for foreigners experimented
on in the United States. FDA extraterritorial application would
further equalize the relationship between U.S. citizens and
foreigners; they would be treated equally regardless of where they
participated in an experiment.

269. Id. at 313.
270. Id. at 313.
271.
Id. at 308.
272.
Id.
273.
Id. at 316. This can be seen in the application of U.S. labor laws. Congress
was forced to specifically authorize extraterritorial application of the laws. However,
now the laws protect U.S. citizens from being discriminated against by U.S.
multinational corporations on the basis of age, race color, religion, sex, or national
origin. U.S. multinational corporations are not prevented from discriminating against
foreigners on such grounds. Id.
274.
Id.

20031

INTERNA TIONA L PHARMACEUTICAL RESEA RCH

3. Potential Conflict of U.S. Law with Other Developed-Country
Regulatory Practices
A multiplicity of extraterritorial regulatory regimes could easily
come into conflict.2 7 5 Many other developed countries have their own
regulatory regimes with their own approaches to research on human
Not only would FDA
subjects and informed consent. 276
extraterritorial application give rise to potential conflicts with local
foreign law, but it may also conflict with laws of other countries
where the drug sponsor seeks approval. For example, while the
United States expects that new drug trials on human subjects will
include the use of a controlled, placebo test group, French researchers
view placebo controlled studies as "cruel and inhumane" because the
277
patients receiving the placebo have "no chance of surviving."
"Extraterritorial application of U.S. law . . . has often been
viewed by other governments as a sign of U.S. arrogance or even as
interference in their territorial affairs. '278 Generally, governments
have been reluctant to attempt to reach their regulatory criminal law
concepts
beyond their own territory. 279 This reluctance "stems28from
0
of sovereignty and the territorial supremacy of States."
Another problem with U.S. extraterritorial application is that it
would apply to experimentation in all foreign countries. 28' The law is
unable to differentiate between the European Union, which is
economically and politically well-situated to protect its citizens to
whatever extent it (and they) desire, and countries like Nigeria where
transient and corrupt regimes may be too easily influenced by the
wishes of drug companies and who may not be interested in affording
their citizens even basic human rights. This problem would be
somewhat negated by current FDA regulations that allow local

275.
For a general description of this situation in antitrust law, see generally
"Numerous antitrust regimes impose inconsistent
Swaine, supra note 248.
requirements and substantial compliance costs, especially for the growing number of
mergers requiring approval in multiple jurisdictions." Id. at 630.
276.
For example, the individual countries of the European Union have their
own individual regulatory regimes, and the European Union has adopted the European
Convention on Biomedicine setting out rules of consent within the European Union.
Dawn Joyce Miller, Research and Accountability: The Need for Uniform Regulation of
InternationalPharmaceuticalDrug Testing, 13 PACE INT'L L. REV. 197, 206 (2001).

Anne E. Wells, Regulating Experimental AIDS Drugs: A Comparison of the
277.
United States and France, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 393, 403 (1990). Unlike
the Europeans, the FDA continues to do placebo-controlled trials even in symptomatic
conditions. Foreign Trials Require Sponsors, supra note 65.
Brown, supra note 146, at 435.
278.
279.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Ad Hoc Committee on
Foreign Payments, Report on Questionable Foreign Payments by Corporations: The
Problem and Approaches to a Solution (1977) (cited in Brown, supra note 146, at 437)
[hereinafter NYC Bar Report].
280. Id.
281.
Gibney, infra note 268, at 317.
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country guidelines to replace U.S. guidelines if they "offer greater
protection ...of the subject. '282 Difficulties would arise should the
European Union not appreciate the United States setting itself up in
a position to decide which set of standards provides more protections.
Drug companies could easily be caught between the two regulatory
regimes should each jurisdiction believe its is the more protective.
C. The Role of InternationalLaw and the Rights of Human Test
Subjects

1. The Status of Research on Humans Under International Law
The use of human subjects in pharmaceutical research has long
been recognized as a human-rights issue. 283
In recent years,
however, little attention has been paid to addressing human-rights
284
issues arising from research on human subjects.
It has been argued that some examples of experimentation in
developing countries have actually been violations of international
law. 285 The rules for clinical trials and research arguably have
international legal status through treaty or custom. 2 86 For example,
it has been argued that the Nuremberg Code is itself an international
legal document. 28 7 The fundamental rule of the Nuremberg Code is
"the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation
without free consent. '288 This principle has appeared in human
rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and
2 89
Political Rights, to which the United States is a signatory.
Additionally, it has been argued that the principles consistently found
in the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Council
of International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS)

282.
21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c)(2).
283.
Dominguez-Urban, supra note 29, at 258.
284.
Kevin M. King, A Proposal for the Effective International Regulation of
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 163, 166 (1998).
285.
Fidler, supra note 45, at 303-04.
286.
Id. at 325.
287.
Id. at 325; Robert F. Drinan, The Nuremberg Principles in International
Law, in GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAzI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE 174, 176 (1995). The problem now is "how to get these principles,
which are universally accepted, implemented and enforced throughout the world."
Drinan, supra, at 176.
288.
Fidler, supra note 45, at 325.
289.
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7 (Mar. 23, 1976), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3b/a-ccpr.htm
[hereinafter U.N. Int'l Covenant].
"[No one shall be subjected wihout his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation." Id.

2003]

INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH

Guidelines have "become customary international law binding on all
states except persistent objectors."'2 90 It is far from clear, however,
that the standards mandating free consent to experimentation have
become sufficiently widely recognized to be established as
international law. The Code is "seen by many as a product of and
'291
reaction to Nazi terror ... no longer useful for today's researchers.
The current regulatory scheme could lead to the odd result of a
U.S. pharmaceutical company being prosecuted in U.S. court for not
paying subjects an adequate amount for their "inconvenience and
time spent," or for paying an amount "so large ... as to induce
prospective subjects to participate in the research against their better
judgment. '292 This provision is among the Ethical Guidelines for
Research Involving Human Subjects issued by the Pan American
Health Organization and is followed by various Central and South
American countries. It appears to be a requirement beyond those of
the Helskinki Declaration, and therefore, U.S. companies testing in
jurisdictions with such a law would be subject to regulation by the
United States for violations of that standard.
The U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
forbids experimentation on any person "without his or her free
consent. '293 This clause, however, has not been used to support any
human-rights action. Without any specific definition of consent or
enforcement mechanism, the right guaranteed by the Covenant is
unenforceable and can easily be ignored. Thus, while informed
consent has some status under international law, 294 it is nevertheless
currently unenforceable.
2. The Lack of Status of Corporate Entities Under International Law
Corporations are not currently treated as legal entities under
international human rights law. 295 Thus, most testing performed on

290.
Fidler, supra note 45, at 326. "To become a tule of customary international
law, a principle must be supported by (1) general and consistent state practice; and (2)
evidence that the general and consistent state practice is followed out of a sense of
legal obligation." Id.
291.
Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and
the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 471-72 (1996).
292.
See Helsinki Guidelines, supra note 17.
293.
U.N. Int'l Covenant, supra note 289. The United States is a signatory of
this document. The Covenant is among the set of documents generally recognized as
defining international human rights.
Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International
Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 154, 160-61 (1997).
294.
Id.
295.
See generally Ratner, supra note 27 (arguing that corporations should be
treated like states under international law). "Norms associated with violations other
than genocide, war crimes, piracy, and slavery are binding only upon states and
persons acting under color of state law." Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and
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humans is currently beyond the reach of international law, since most
296
research is conducted without the participation of a government.
The Nuremberg Trials, however, did show the "willingness of key
corporate responsibility at the
legal actors to contemplate
A movement in favor of recognizing
international level. ' 97
corporations as having status for the purposes of international
In 1990, the U.N.
human rights law has recently begun. 298
Commission on Transnational Corporations completed a U.N. Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations, which was an attempt to set
forth standards of host government behavior toward transnational
corporations. 299 The final draft of the Code stated that corporations

must respect human rights. 300

The Code was, however, never

enacted, and the Commission itself was eventually consolidated into
another agency. 30 1 The United States has occasionally attempted to
force corporations to comply with international human rights law, but
30 2
generally, only on a case-by-case basis.

Commentators have suggested that international regulatory
institutions should be created to deal with the special problems posed
by transnational corporations. Such institutions would benefit from
being an economy of scale; a single institution could ensure that
corporations comply with human rights standards, whereas many
national governments would have to have redundant regulatory
bodies to accomplish the same goal. 30 3 Also, this would avoid the

Principles:Promoting Multinational Corporate Responsibility by Amending the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 905 (1999).
See King, supra note 284, at 178. Government participation is necessary to
296.
label conduct as "torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment." Id.
297.
Ratner, supra note 27, at 477. In these cases individuals were on trial, but
the courts routinely spoke in terms of corporate responsibilities and obligations. Id.
298.
Erin Elizabeth Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations
Have No Incentive to Define Human Rights, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101, 124 (2002)
(calling for the United Nations to promulgate human rights standards that companies
would be held to, and that would have legal effect). Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and
Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of
InternationalHuman Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 154, 158 (1997) (citing Report
of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration, Annex I, at 8, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.177/20 (1995)).
299.
Frey, supra note 298, at 166-67.
300.
Id.
301.
Id.
302.
Id. at 169-70.
For example, the Anti-Apartheid Act prohibited U.S.
companies from doing business directly with South Africa. The United States has
frequently used embargos to pressure states accused of violating human rights.
303.
Macek, supra note 298, at 120. Also, such institutions could use levels of
specialization that would improve their efficiency compared with national
governments.
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problem of forcing corporations or nations to take on a competitive
30 4
risk others in the marketplace might be unwilling to adopt.
D. Nations Must Work Together to Formulate Protectionsfor Human
Research Subjects
The need for regulation of testing on human subjects in the
developing world urgently needs to be addressed.
Unilateral
extraterritorial regulatory action by the United States or the
European Union would be the fastest way to address the problem.
This would, however, amount to legal imperialism; the developed
countries would be dictating policy to the developing world. Further,
such action would be difficult and costly. The FDA currently
conducts almost no monitoring of corporate activity in the developing
world. The United States would incur great cost by unilaterally
positioning itself as a worldwide regulatory body.
Developing
countries and the European Union would likely resent such an action
because it would remove their flexibility in formulating policy. The
alternative, disallowing use of foreign research data, is even less
palatable because it would greatly increase the time required to bring
drugs to market.
Developing nations would be denied the
opportunity to obtain what can be free medical treatment and
infrastructure from the experiments that do have a reasonable chance
at success.
Developed and developing nations need to work together to
compose a set of enforceable rules to govern testing on human
subjects.
An international body, including both developed and
developing nations, would be the best vehicle for creating a workable
set of international rules. As an organization, the U.N. Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is well positioned to
30 5
create a set of international rules governing research on humans.
UNESCO alone, however, probably would not be able to enforce any
rules or guidelines it might formulate. It would still need to rely on
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Id. For example, it would be difficult for a developing country to adopt
tougher informed consent standards for fear that it would drive drug companies away,
and lose the positive externalities that result from drug testing.
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"UNESCO, the premier international organization in the fields of science,
culture, communications and education, has the legal authority to negotiate and
sponsor the codification and implementation of international instruments advancing
technology, public health and human rights." Allyn L. Taylor, Globalization and
Biotechnology: UNESCO and an InternationalStrategy to Advance Human Rights and
Public Health, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 479, 481 (1999). For a set of proposed guidelines,
see King, supra note 284. The Pan American Health Organization, a regional office of
the World Health Organization, has published its own set of guidelines. Pan American
Health Organization, Division of Health and Human Development, DHHD Ethical
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HDPIHDRIRPG/RGPethics-guide-2002.pdf.
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the enforcement mechanisms of states, primarily in the developed
world.
Alternatively, the United Nations could create an
international body to enforce the regulations.
At least one
commentator has already called for a "permanent Nuremberg" 3 06-a
permanent sitting tribunal that would enforce human rights. If the
meaning of consent were better developed under international law,
and corporations were treated as subject to international law, such a
body could be used to provide protection from unethical corporate
action.
Another potentially useful model is the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) regulation of
transparency of international economic activity. The OECD does not
itself enforce laws. Instead, it has created a set of guidelines with
which its Member States are to comply. The OECD Convention
requires states to criminalize certain activities. 30 7 An independent
international organization similar to the OECD could be created to
regulate worldwide testing on humans. It could formulate a set of
guidelines with input from both the developed and developing nations
that would prescribe procedures to ensure protection of human rights,
as well as the validity of data.
Member States of such an
organization could agree only to accept research data from
experiments conducted in other Member States.
Such an
organization would be a very useful tool in moving toward
harmonization of international drug testing standards. The FDA
clearly has congressional authorization to work with such an
organization. The FDCA grants the FDA the power to work with
representatives of other nations to facilitate the drug approval
process. Participation in an international organization would be a
valid extraterritorial activity for the FDA.

VI. CONCLUSION

In the coming years, international drug research will only
continue to grow in frequency and importance and to effect more
people in the developing world. Under current U.S. law, it appears
that the FDA is unable to provide protection for these people through
extraterritorial regulation of the behavior of drug companies.
Allowing the FDA to regulate extraterritorially, either through court
approval or congressional action, may provide the best short-term
solution to protecting human research subjects. This is not, however,
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Drinan, supra note 287, at 176-77. Such a tribunal would probably be
similar in nature to the new U.N. War Crimes Tribunal.
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Ratner, supra note 27, at 535.
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the best available approach. The United States should cooperate
with other nations from the developed and developing world to create
an international regulatory scheme that accounts for the interests of
the differently situated nations. The rights of human subjects of drug
research are clearly a matter for international law. Cross-border
research will test the international community's dedication to human
rights.
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